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Public Participation in National Law Making: Examining Kenyan Legal Framework

 

ABSTRACT

Public participation is an essential element of democracy. In a republic such as Kenya where the people are the real custodians of the sovereign power, it becomes necessary for them to be given a chance to directly exercise this power. Even though the Constitution recognizes the direct exercise of sovereign power, it is silent on how this is to be achieved. This article takes the opinion that sovereign power is exercised directly through public participation and takes note of the fact that the mechanism through which public participation can be achieved is not outlined in the Constitution. For this reason, the article examines various constitutional provisions that lay the foundation through which public participation can footed. Further, the essay looks into the attempted creation of legislation and policy on public participation and finally the threshold for sufficient public participation.

1.     Introduction

In Kenya, as per Article 1(2) of the 2010 Constitution, the prevailing constitutional paradigm aligns with the tenets of representative democracy. While representative democracy presents several benefits, it is essential to recognize that it also carries inherent drawbacks. For example, it has been said that: “Democratic elections alone do not remedy the crisis of confidence in government.”[1] Certainly, it is a truism that in representative democracy, particularly in the lawmaking body, the representatives' decisions do not always reflect the voice of the people. Hence, democratic representation cannot be said to be achieved by simply exercising one’s right to vote.[2] It goes beyond that and there has never been a viable justification for a democratic system in which public participation is limited to voting.[3] On the other hand, pure direct democracy is rather impractical.[4] This leads to the urgent need for the balance to be struck such that the democratically elected representatives are held into account and their decisions commensurate with the needs of the society. This balance is achieved through public participation.

It must be emphasized that public participation is a key element of democracy. While contemplating upon this issue, the Supreme Court of Kenya held as follows:

“Public participation is, therefore, a major pillar, and bedrock of our democracy and good governance. It is the basis for changing the content of the State, envisioned by the Constitution, so that the citizens have a major voice and impact on the equitable distribution of political power and resources.”[5]

The logic behind this sits at the core of one objective of democracy – free expression of the will of the people.[6]  Democracy unfolds the grand stage where the people cast their voices into the collective script of decisions hence bringing up definitiveness in leadership. The imputation of this is, ideally, democracy (even representative democracy) can only be said to be achieved in lawmaking when the laws speak the heart of the people.

At the very outset, a pertinent question begs: what is public participation?

Public participation has been defined as:

“[T]he process by which citizens, as individuals, groups or communities (also known as stakeholders), take part in the conduct of public affairs, interact with the state and other non-state actors to influence decisions, policies, programs, legislation and provide oversight in service delivery, development and other matters concerning their governance and public interest, either directly or through freely chosen representatives.”[7]

This may be achieved through many means but the bottom line has always been that public participation must be real and not illusory.[8] For this reason, there must be a need for a well-structured legal and institutional framework that facilitates public participation.

This analysis is grounded in the knowledge that legislation is deficient in outlining the procedure for public participation in Kenya. For this reason, the examination relies on caselaw to determine the existing framework on public participation in this country.

2.     The Constitutional Underpinnings of Public Participation in Lawmaking

Under Article 10, the Constitution stipulates the national values and principles and solidifies public participation as one of them.[9] These values and principles are binding to all state organs, state officers, public officers, and persons whenever any of them: applies or interprets this Constitution; enacts, applies or interprets any law; or makes or implements public policy decisions.[10] Even though it does not provide a clear definition or outline for its implementation, various Constitutional provisions can be interpreted to form the foundation for the principle of public participation.[11]

The principle is hinged on the fact that all the sovereign power rests with the people of Kenya and is to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution.[12] It has been said that:

“[P]ublic participation is a national value that is an expression of the sovereignty of the people as articulated under Article 1 of the Constitution.  Article 10 makes public participation a National Value as a form of expression of the sovereignty.  Hence, public participation is an established right in Kenya; a justifiable one – indeed one of the cornerstones of our new democracy.”[13]

The Constitution stipulates that the sovereign power resides with the people of Kenya.[14] On top of this, it states that sovereign power can be exercised either directly or indirectly through elected representatives and this must be by the Constitution.[15]  The use of the word ‘directly’ cannot be in vain.  Since one finds limited guidance from the Constitution on the direct exercise of sovereignty, a logical conclusion can be drawn – that public participation stands as the sole means through which sovereignty can be directly exercised by the people.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that public participation is not merely a policy inclusion; it is woven into the very fabric of the Kenyan Constitution. Beyond the sovereignty of the people, the Constitution provides for the freedom of expression; a footing upon which diverse voices can contribute to the national discourse.[16] The Constitution further provides for equality in decision-making and recognizes that the views of every citizen weigh in determining the course of the nation.[17] On top of that, the right to information when applied to public participation enables the public to make knowledge-based contributions.[18] These fundamental pillars– freedom of expression, equality in decision-making, and the right to information – form the foundation on which the edifice of public participation rests.

With regards to lawmaking, Article 118 of the Constitution provides as follows:

(1)   Parliament shall—

(a)    conduct its business in an open manner, and its sittings and those of its committees shall be in public; and

(b)   facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of Parliament and its committees.

(2)   Parliament may not exclude the public, or any media, from any sitting unless in exceptional circumstances the relevant Speaker has determined that there are justifiable reasons for the exclusion.

As observed, it is upon the Parliament to ensure that the public contributes to the legislative and other business of Parliament and its committees. Parliament would achieve this by coming up with legislation that would set the procedure upon which public participation can be achieved or at a bare minimum, enact an act for the protection of the principle as it has been done in various states such as Canada[19] and the United States of America.[20]

3.     Attempted Creation Legislation and Policy on Public Participation

There has been an attempt to establish a definitive legal framework for public participation to be achieved including the tabling of the Public Participation Bill 2018 which sought to establish various guiding principles such as:

(a)    that the public, communities and organisations to be affected by a decision shall have a right to be consulted and involved in the decision making process;

(b)   provision of effective mechanisms for the involvement of the public, communities and organizations that would be affected by or be interested in a decision;

(c)    participants' equitable access to the information they need to participate in a meaningful manner; that public views shall be taken into consideration in decision making;

(d)   development of appropriate feedback mechanisms; adherence to the national values under Article 10 of the Constitution;

(e)    adherence to the principles of leadership and integrity set out in Chapter Six of the Constitution;

(f)    adherence to the principles of public participation as may be prescribed by any written law; and

(g)   promotion of sustainable decisions recognising the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers.[21]

The Schedule of the Bill further spells out various general guidelines for public participation. In summary, the general guidelines notably emphasized the opportunities for public participation, public awareness, adequate notice and access to the process, realistic timeframe for consultation, processing of responses, and credibility and integrity of the process.[22]

Curiously, the Bill fails to advance a standard mechanism through which public participation can be done (e.g., the creation of an oversight institution or one that handles all public participation issues or stating the form through which feedback from the public can be achieved). This must be for a good reason – the law does not want to be cast in stone. Here, the Bill recognizes that the public comprises people from diverse walks of life and their contributions should not be curtailed by mere technicalities. Of course:

‘‘The forms of facilitating an appropriate degree of participation in the law making process are indeed capable of infinite variation. What matters is that at the end of the day a reasonable opportunity is offered to members of the public and all interested parties to know about the issue and have an adequate say. What amounts to a reasonable opportunity will depend on the circumstance of each case… What is necessary is that the nature of the concerns of different sectors of the public should be communicated to the law maker and taken into account in formulating the regulations.’’[23]

Instead, the Bill puts an obligation upon the institutions conducting public participation to draw programmes for the same. A public participation programme that has been alluded to shall clearly identify–

(a)    specific purposes for consultation;

(b)   the community, profession or groups to be consulted;

(c)    the length of the consultations;

(d)   whether submissions should be oral, written or both; and

(e)    the issues or matter for consultation.[24]

Apart from the Bill, there also exists a Kenya Draft Policy on Public Participation which states that:

“The main objective of the policy is to provide the framework for the management and coordination of public participation in Kenya for the fulfilment of the constitutional requirement on citizen engagement in development and governance processes in the country. Public bodies in Kenya will comply with this policy as a constitutional requirement.”[25]

While the Act and the policy currently lack legal force in Kenya, their existence suggests that they can guarantee that the constitutional mandate of public participation can be met. The speed of the process is important, as it paves the way for these instruments to gain legitimacy, reinforcing their role as facilitators for meaningful public participation.

4.     Sufficient Public Participation

It has been demonstrated that public participation is a significant aspect of lawmaking, based on various constitutional principles. However, there is a need to establish a threshold to weigh the level of public participation, to determine whether it is sufficient or not. Jurisprudence from our courts has insisted that public participation must be real and not illusory.[26] For example, in Mugo & 14 others v Matiang’i & another; Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission of Kenya & 19 others it was held that a list of attendees of a meeting by itself would not meet the required threshold for public participation.[27] In another case, it was held that huddling a few people in a five-star hotel for one day or using a newspaper advert which was beyond the means of the poor, illiterate, ordinary persons, would not suffice as public participation.[28] Here, the court demonstrated that public participation is not reserved for only the elites – the Wanjiku is also significant.

It must be noted that:

 “Not everyone should be heard orally. The basic elements of public participation include the dissemination of information, invitation to participate in the process and consultation on the legislation. Accountability, responsiveness and openness are the cornerstones of a democratic legislative process.”[29]

Therefore, it cannot be expected of the law maker that a proposal hearing will be given to every individual who claims to be affected. [30]What matters is that the public is given adequate opportunity to participate.

This leads to the question: What can be said to constitute sufficient public participation?

As it has been established, there is no legislation on public participation in Kenya, however, courts have developed various important guiding principles. Notably, the Supreme Court of Kenya pronounced itself in the case of British American Tobacco Kenya, PLC v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health, Tobacco Control Board & others (as was cited in Constitutional and Human Rights petition 215 of 2020 in the High Court at Nairobi) when it listed the following guiding principles:[31]

      I.          As a constitutional principle under Article 10(2) of the Constitution, public participation applies to all aspects of governance.

    II.          The public officer and or entity charged with the performance of a particular duty bears the onus of ensuring and facilitating public participation.

  III.          The lack of a prescribed legal framework for public participation is no excuse for not conducting public participation; the onus is on the public entity to give effect to this constitutional principle using reasonable means.

  IV.          Public participation must be real and not illusory. It is not a cosmetic or a public relations act. It is not a mere formality to be undertaken as a matter of course just to ‘fulfill’ a constitutional requirement. There is need for both quantitative and qualitative components in public participation.

    V.          Public participation is not an abstract notion; it must be purposive and meaningful.

  VI.          Public participation must be accompanied by reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity. Reasonableness will be determined on a case-to-case basis.

VII.          Public participation is not necessarily a process consisting of oral hearings, written submissions can also be made. The fact that someone was not heard is not enough to annul the process.

VIII.          Allegation of lack of public participation does not automatically vitiate the process. The allegations must be considered within the peculiar circumstances of each case: the mode, degree, scope and extent of public participation is to be determined on a case-to-case basis.

  IX.          Components of meaningful public participation include the following:

a.      clarity of the subject matter for the public to understand;

b.     structures and processes (medium of engagement) of participation that are clear and simple;

c.      opportunity for balanced influence from the public in general;

d.     commitment to the process;

e.      inclusive and effective representation;

f.      integrity and transparency of the process;

g.     capacity to engage on the part of the public, including that the public must be first sensitized on the subject matter.

The Supreme Court, as the highest judicial authority in the Republic, issues binding decisions of all other courts.[32] Therefore, a duty is imposed upon lower courts to make decisions based on the guidelines set.

5.     Conclusion

This essay has examined the legal framework regulating public participation in Kenya, emphasizing the imperative that public participation must be real and not an illusion. The essay has drawn guidance from the established principles articulated in the British American Tobacco case as outlined above. Further, since society is characterized by diverse demographic groups, it becomes necessary that there should be a flexible legal approach to facilitate the exercise of sovereignty and various constitutional rights by its constituents.

Nevertheless, existing lacunae persist, including the following: the criteria for one's capacity to participate; exceptional circumstances warranting the negation of public participation; and the allocation of the burden of proof in situations where the occurrence of public participation is uncertain. These unresolved are open for further scholarly inquiry.



* LLB Student, Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Faculty of Law.

[1] Beth Simone Noveck, ‘Evolving Democracy for the 21st Century’ (Huffpost 18 January 2012) <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/evolving-democracy-for-th_b_1101791> accessed 21 December 2023.

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] Elliot Bulmer, Direct Democracy (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2017) 12.

[5] In the Matter of the National Land Commission [2015] eKLR

[6] Constitution of Kenya 2010 (CoK), Art 33.

[7] See Kenya Draft Policy on Public Participation 2018.

[8] British American Tobacco Kenya, PLC (formerly British American Tobacco Kenya Limited) v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others;Kenya Tobacco Control Alliance & another (Interested Parties);Mastermind Tobacco Kenya Limited (The Affected Party) [2019] eKLR

[9] CoK, Art 10 (2) (a).

[10] Ibid, Art 10 (1).

[11] Mugo & 14 others v Matiang’i & another; Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission of Kenya & 19 others (Interested Party) [2022] KEHC 158 (KLR)

[12] CoK, Art 1 (1).

[13] Peter Makau Musyoka and Award of Mining Concessionary Rights to the Mui Coal Basin Deposits [2015] eKLR

[14] CoK, Art 1 (1).

[15] Ibid, Art 1 (2).

[16] Ibid, Art 33.

[17] ibid, Art 27.

[18] Ibid, Art 35.

[19] Protection of Public Participation Act of Canada

[20] American Legislative Exchange Council, ‘Public Participation Protection Act’(American Legislative Exchange Council, 3 September 2023)  <https://alec.org/model-policy/public-participation-protection-act/> (accessed 22 December 2023).

[21] Public Participation Bill 2018, cl 4.

[22] ibid, sched

[23] Mugo & 14 others v Matiang’i & another; Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission of Kenya & 19 others (Interested Party) (n 11)

[24] Public Participation Bill 2018, sched.

[25] Kenya Draft Policy on Public Participation 2018.

[26] British American Tobacco Kenya, PLC (formerly British American Tobacco Kenya Limited) v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others (n 8)

[27] (n 11)

[28] Kiambu County Government & 3 others v Robert N. Gakuru & others [2014] eKLR

[29] International v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Others (CCT 12/05) [2006] ZACC 11

[30] Minister of Health v New Chicks South Africa PTY Ltd [2005] ZACC 14

[31] Law Society of Kenya v National Assembly & 2 others; Association of Professional Societies In East Africa & another (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 10070 (KLR)

[32] CoK, Art 163 (7).

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