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MINORS’ CAPACITY IN CONTRACTS: BINDING CONTRACTS AND REMEDIES

Many a time, when people (including lawyers) talk about the best interests of a child, they mainly focus on family or criminal matters. However, very little attention is given to issues regarding commercial transactions that minors engage in. In fact, it is said that “the law of ‘minors’, or ‘infants’ contracts is very complicated.” [1] The root of this complication is the fact that the law desires to protect minors on one hand whileas it still wishes to safeguard the interests of traders on the other.[2] This begs the question, where does the balance lie? More complications can be speculated due to the great technological advancements in the trading sector whereby almost anyone can purchase anything online with great ease.[3] Therefore, this imperatively demands scrutiny be done on the laws relating to the formation of contracts with minors.

At common law, a minor or infant can simply be defined as a person who has not reached the age of majority, i.e., one who is not an adult.[1] Such a person is below the age of legal competence.[2] Under the Kenyan Constitution, the term adult means ‘an individual who has attained the age of eighteen years’.[3] The Constitution goes ahead to define a child as an individual who has not attained the age of eighteen years[4] and therefore it is safe to say that the terms minor, infant and child denote the same thing under the Kenyan Law.

In general, capacity is an essential element of a contract. It is a requirement that for one to enter into a legally binding contract, that person must be legally competent.[5] For this reason, age becomes a very key factor when one seeks to examine the capacity of a party entering into a contract. What then happens when a minor enters into a contract?

Depending on the various classes of contracts, minors’ contracts are regarded as either binding or voidable at the option of the minor[6]  but binding upon the other party.[7] The only binding contract for a minor is one for necessaries.[8] This type of contract cannot be voidable at the option of a minor hence, once entered into, it is enforceable with age being immaterial. Thus, this paper examines the different kinds of contracts for necessaries as well as the remedies available in case a minor breaches such contracts.

CONTRACTS FOR NECESSARIES

As observed, at common law, contracts for the supply of necessaries to minors are binding. This is to mean that they impose legal obligations upon the minor which must be fulfilled. Moreover, the common law position has been echoed under Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act which stipulates that:      

(1)   Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity to contract, and to transfer and acquire property: Provided that, where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant or minor, or to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor.

(2)   Necessaries in this section mean goods suitable to the condition in life of the infant or minor or other person, and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery.[9]

Particular emphasis must be given to Sub-Section (1) as it provides that in case a minor enters into a contract for necessaries, that contract is binding and he must pay a reasonable price for the commodity or service. What then is a reasonable price? The Act answers this by stating that such is a question of facts and it depends on the circumstances of the case.[10]  This may be determined as per the terms of the contract, valuation or by observing the prevailing market price.[11]

In the second part of the Section, the Act defines what necessaries are. In essence, they include goods suitable to the condition of life for the minor and those that are his actual requirements at the time of sale and delivery. This provision imposes a burden upon a plaintiff suing a minor and alleging that the contract was for necessaries to prove that it was so at the time of sale and also at the time of delivery.[12] To summarize, the legal meaning of this word is founded on the common understanding of the term.

Therefore, necessaries consist of food, drink, clothing, medical attention, and a suitable place of residence even though liability for necessaries is not limited to articles required to sustain life.[13] Actually, in some cases, this term is not limited to the ordinary things that sustain life but also depends on the ‘rank, position, fortune, earning capacity, and mode of living’ of the parents as it was held in an American court.[14]

One peculiar issue that must be elucidated is the distinction between the term ‘necessaries’ and ‘necessities’. Minors can only be held liable for contracts for necessaries and not necessities.[15] The word necessaries as a legal term of art encompass different things depending on the minor’s station in life or the peculiar circumstances at the time of the contract.[16]  On the other hand, necessities are goods or services that must be provided to safeguard basic needs and sustain life.[17] Two classical cases are important to demonstrate this distinction.

In the case of Ryder v Wombwell[18] where a minor had a total annual income of £500 and who had purchased fine jewellery from the plaintiff, the court held that such, although they may not be viewed as necessities, they were necessaries since the defendant was a son of a deceased baronet and had moved into the ‘highest society’.[19]

The second case is that of Nash v Inman[20] where a minor, who, as an undergraduate student had gone into a tailor shop to purchase clothes on credit which he failed to pay. The father of the minor was called to the court as a witness and demonstrated that the minor had enough clothes according to his position in life. The court held that the contract was not for necessities hence it was voidable at the option of the minor. The clothing was of ‘an extravagant and ridiculous style having regards to the position of the boy’.[21]

Having tried to define necessaries, another critical question emerges: What happens if a minor borrows money for payment of necessaries? The rule that answers is found in the law of equity. Normally, at common law, such a contract cannot be enforced and the money cannot be recovered simply because there is the risk that such money may be ‘borrowed for necessaries but laid out and spent at a tavern’.[22] In equity, however, if it can be proven that the money was entirely spent on necessaries, the lender of the money stood at the place of the person paid and hence entitled to be repaid.[23]

Finally, contracts for necessaries include contracts of employment and training.[24] Such a contract must be for the purposes of obtaining instructions or education for the minor to acquire skills that will be essential later in his professional journey.[25] In a case where a minor had entered into a contract of employment with a railway company and agreed to the terms of its insurance policy, the court held that the minor was bound by his promise and therefore had to pay.[26]

In spite of the fact that this paper does not intend to cover the complex legal principles available when it comes to employment for minors, it recognizes the fact that nowadays minors are being engaged in employment contracts in the world of arts and technology. It must further be noted that under the Kenyan Employment Act, employing minors is illegal for children under the age of 13 years.[27] If the child is between the ages of 13 to 16, he or she may be employed for light work as long as it does not affect his or her health or interfere with his or her education.[28] Such a contract, other provisions of the law notwithstanding, must be oral and not written.[29] The issue of employment for children is a very delicate matter in the realm of labour law and human rights.

Various complexities (or rather contradictions) can be observed in the existing Employment Act on this matter. For example, the Act defines a child as one who is below the age of 18 years[30] yet leaves out the requisite provisions in cases where a child between 16 to 18 years of age enters into an employment contract. The research done herein cannot adequately handle the whole matter since doing so will be drifting away from the main issue: Contract for necessaries with minors as parties. Therefore, stating the underlying legal stipulation is sufficient to demonstrate the dynamics involved.

With that, it is apparent that the scope of the term ‘necessaries’ is very subjective hence its application varies from person to person and from case to case. For that reason, courts must be very careful with how they handle matters of contracts between whom one or more a minor. They must acknowledge that every time a matter involving a child is being dealt with, it must be done in consideration of the best interests of the child. Further, they must strike the balance between the interests of the child and those of the trader or employer with whom a child enters into a contract with.

REMEDIES

As it has been illustrated, the interests of the trader must be safeguarded where a contract between the trader and a minor is binding. The remedies that are available for the binding contracts may exist either in common law or at equity. The phrase ‘for binding contracts’ here is used very deliberately because courts will be reluctant to issue a remedy for a contract that is not binding since doing so shall seem like enforcement of a void contract.[31] This will be contrary to the existing principles governing the law of contracts at common law.

       i.          Remedies at Common Law (Legal Remedies)

At common law, the only available remedy for breach of contract, in general, is damages. In many texts, the remedy of damages is discussed as applicable against any party that breaches a contract as long as the breached contract is binding.[32] Damages act as an indemnity in that they prevent the innocent party from suffering the loss that is caused by the breach of the innocent party.[33] In the words of Lord Atkin, ‘damages for breach of contract were in the nature of compensation, not punishment’.[34] The issue of age is immaterial when damages are awarded against a party. However, damages can only be awarded if the contract was valid and binding.[35] Courts at common law will not entertain a matter involving a void contract.

     ii.          Remedies at equity (Equitable Remedies)

There are different remedies available at equity. These remedies include specific performance, injunctions, rescission, and restitution. From the very outset, it is important to note that at equity, the court conducts itself in a very discretionary manner when awarding its remedies.[36] Parties in a matter before an equitable jurisdiction must know that they are not entitled to equitable remedies even if their matter succeeds since it all depends on the opinion the court forms.[37]  This is because courts exercising equitable jurisdiction are in pursuit of ensuring that fairness and justice are arrived at.

The second point to note is that in awarding these remedies, the doctrine of mutuality applies especially when it comes to the remedy of specific performance.[38] This doctrine states that if one party to a contract is entitled to specific performance, so ipso ipso facto is the other, for the equitable remedy, if it exists at all, must be mutual.[39] The court, therefore, asks itself, ‘Can this remedy be enforced against the other party if the positions of the parties can be reversed?” If the at equity the equities are equal, then the court must be sure that what it rules against one party can also be enforced on the other party if the outcome would have been in favour of the other party. Due to this, specific performance cannot be issued as a remedy against a minor nor can a minor pray to the court to issue the same against another party.[40]

Sometimes, the contract entered into may be void and dismissing a matter solely on the ground that it is unenforceable may be unfair and unjust to the innocent party (an adult). Leaving this unsolved will not only motivate minors to enter into contracts with malice at the expense of the party they engage with.[41] For this reason, the remedy of restitution was crafted by equitable courts to remedy this challenge. For this remedy to be issued, fraudulent activities of the minor must be demonstrated.[42]  Therefore, a minor who fraudulently purchases goods and services resulting to a void contract shall be held into account when this remedy is issued against them.

In summary, courts will consider the facts of the case in order to exercise their discretion while awarding equitable remedies. Proper emphasis must be given to the point that specific performance cannot be issued against or in favour of a minor because there is lack of mutuality. With that established, it can be said that equitable remedies are available with the limits set out in legal principles.

CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the concept of binding minors’ contracts with regard to necessaries and the general rules that form the basis of legal and equitable remedies that can be issued against a minor. It goes ahead to acknowledge the various gaps surrounding minors’ contracts, especially in modern employment laws as well as in the issuance of remedies. What stands out in pursuit of filling these gaps is the principle of ‘the best interest of a child’. However, the balance must be stricken between the interests of a trader and those of a child. These issues identified open up chances for more research and development.

 BY MUNGAI K


[1] ibid

[2] ‘Minor’, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edn West Group 1990).

[3] Constitution of Kenya 2010, Art 260.

[4] ibid

[5] Richards (n 1).

[6] Richards (n 1) 111.

[7] Halsbury’s Laws (12th edn, 2017) vol 57, para 698-1421.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Sale of Goods Act, s 4.

[10] Ibid, s 10 (2).

[11] Ibid, s 11.

[12] Beatson et al (n 2) 234.

[13] ‘Necessaries’, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edn West Group 1990).

[14] Caruso v. Caruso, 102 N.J.Eq. 393, 141 A. 16, 19.

[15]  Beatson et al (n 2) 234.

[16] Peter v Fleming (1840) 6 M&W 42.

[17] Beatson et al (n 2) 234.

[18] (1868) LR 3 Ex 90.

[19] Ibid

[20] [1908] 2 KB 1.

[21] Nash (n 23).

[22] Earle v Peale (1719) 91 E.R. 336.

[23] Marlow v Pitfeild 24 E.R. 516.

[24] Richard Stone and James Devenney, the Modern Law of Contract (11th edn, Routledge 2015) 62.

[25] Emily Finch and Stefan Fafinski, Law of Contracts (5th edn, Pearson 2017) 27.

[26] Clements v London and North Western Railways Company [1894] 2 QB 482.

[27] Employment Act 2007, s 56 (1).

[28] Ibid, s 56 (2).

[29] Ibid, s 57.

[30] Employment Act 2007, s 2.

[31] See: Beatson et al (n 2) 242 see also: Stock v Wilson [1913] 2 KB 235.

[32] See: Finch (n 28) 190.

[33] ibid

[34] Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488.

[35] Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2012) 755.

[36] Paul Davies and Graham Virgo, Equity & Trust: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP 2013) 85.

[37] Ibid

[38] Abdulzak Mbarak v. Faraj bin Ahmed el-Aweni (1956) EA 120.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Flight v. Boland (1828) 38 E.R. 817.

[41] Beatson et al (n 2) 243.

[42] Ibid.

[1] Paul Richards, Law of Contract (13th edn, Pearson 2017) 951.

[2] Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (30th edn, OUP 2016) 233.

[3] Richards (n 1).

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